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SUMMARY 
Companies operating in multiple countries face different and often changing regimes of 
environmental regulation. This regulatory turbulence raises the question of what 
environmental strategies multinational enterprises with a portfolio of divergent regulatory 
regimes should develop in relation to their international business expansion strategies. We 
argue that multinationals seeking to develop an effective environmental strategy should 
integrate relative regulatory stringency and international market interdependence. We discuss 
and illustrate four environmental strategies that match different regulatory/market 
configurations for multinationals from both developed and emerging markets, as well as the 
factors that drive strategic changes. We introduce a „regulatory turbulence tool‟ that describes 
relevant regulatory/market configurations and prescribes contingently effective, dynamic 
environmental strategies.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Globalization has left a lasting imprint on the business community. Private and public actors 
from around the world are increasingly interconnected, materializing through globally 
disaggregated production value chains, universal consumer products, and non-discriminatory 
trade regulation.
1
 While economic globalization seems to be undeniable at first sight, a closer 
look at the international trade and investment statistics suggests that international business is 
often semi-globalized or regionalized,
2
 thus balancing popular accounts that „the world is 
flat‟.3 Certain markets have remained highly (sub)national in nature.4 Besides, 
internationalization processes include expansion as well as retreat, which may be in response 
to regulatory fluctuation and changed regulatory differences between a company‟s home and 
host countries. So today‟s international business markets are dynamic and cover the whole 
spectrum, from global to local. 
At the same time, regulatory regimes have predominantly remained the realm of national 
governments. For sure, the World Trade Organization overrules countries that breach a global 
level playing field, while the European Union, NAFTA, and Mercosur issue transnational 
rules that bind countries in a region.
5
 The nation-state remains the main issuer of laws and 
other regulations in a variety of fields that are relevant to the business community.
6
 Given the 
national discretion to issue regulation, different political preferences, and uneven government 
capacities to enforce regulation,
7
 it is obvious that, for a given field, regulatory stringency 
varies significantly from one country to another. Moreover, regulation does not develop in 
isolation: countries interact with each other and with corporations, making regulation part of a 
competitive game.
8
 
A prominent example of regulatory regime differences and competition is the natural 
environment. Certain countries issue stringent regulation that reflects the political desire to 
protect the natural environment (for its beauty but also for public health reasons), while others 
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prioritize economic expansion.
9
 And yet other countries issue stringent regulation but are 
corrupt or do not have the apparatus to uphold their own rules.
10
 As a result, regulatory 
regimes pertaining to the natural environment range from very lax to highly stringent. 
Environmental regulation has recently gained importance, due to (perceived) threats like 
climate change (e.g., the European emissions trading scheme),
11
 pollution from production 
epicenters (like eastern China),
12
 and the imminent shortage of strategic natural resources 
(such as petroleum).
13
 Despite repeated speculations over greater convergence in global 
environmental regulation due to these developments, regulatory divergence remains 
considerable. Furthermore, governments regularly change their environmental policies owing 
to evolving societal preferences.
14
 As a result, firms experience considerable dynamics in 
their regulatory environments, even if they do not internationalize.  
The big question, then, is what forward-looking businesses that operate in multiple 
countries – which may or may not be interconnected and which may or may not have 
stringent regulatory regimes – should do. Is it wise for companies to adopt idiosyncratic 
strategies that meet the specificities of divergent contexts or is it effective to develop 
regionally or globally uniform strategies? Even more challenging is the question of whether 
there are strategies that are beneficial to both corporate self-interests and the natural 
environment. This is a particularly difficult question, since academic studies have shown that 
socio-environmental efforts do not necessarily lead to higher financial payoffs.
15
 The business 
case for responsible business is thus not that clear-cut, especially within an international 
context. On the other hand, it has been argued that companies can reap a sustainable 
competitive advantage by integrating socio-environmental and economic goals, thereby 
creating a different „competitive context‟.16 Yet, we know little about the implications of 
different regulatory regimes for the internationalization strategies of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs). The international business and economics literature has focused on several aspects, 
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such as generic strategic approaches for international business,
17
 the societal consequences of 
MNE activities for host countries,
18
 the impact of regulatory stringency on international trade 
and foreign direct investment (FDI),
19
 and the development of „green‟ capabilities for 
MNEs.
20
  
While each of these aspects is undeniably relevant, the combination of market 
interdependence and country specificity has hardly been studied in relation to the natural 
environment at the firm level.
21
 Especially environmental strategies of MNEs from emerging 
markets, who have become increasingly important in the global economy, have remained 
underresearched. Furthermore, most studies have been relatively static, ignoring the changes 
in regulatory environments to which MNEs are exposed. Our focus, therefore, is on how 
international businesses should proceed when facing different combinations of market 
interdependence and regulatory stringency, especially when these forces are dynamic in 
nature. In particular, what environmental strategies should they adopt that fit particular, 
evolving interdependence/stringency configurations?  
We do so by developing a conceptual framework that draws on both the economic 
dimension of market interdependence and the institutional dimension of regulatory stringency. 
We discuss both dimensions and identify strategies that fit particular combinations. Next to 
articulating the rationale for and form of each environmental strategy, we exemplify the 
different strategies – drawing on a sample of MNEs originating from both developed and 
emerging markets – and show the dynamics that may induce MNEs to embrace other 
strategies. Finally, we elucidate the implications for international business and show how 
MNEs can implement these strategies in a world of regulatory turbulence.  
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INSTITUTIONAL AND ECONOMIC FORCES 
There are specific local and global factors that make up the context within which international 
businesses operate. For environmental strategies, the regulatory regimes of  home and host 
countries are particularly relevant. It is widely recognized that government regulation is a key 
institutional determinant of corporate behavior,
22
 especially when pertaining to environmental 
issues.
23
 Environmental regulation shapes the corporate playing field by limiting or taxing 
negative environmental effects such as pollution and the use of non-renewable natural 
resources.
24
 The next important dimension is the economic interdependence of a (prospective) 
host country‟s market with those of other countries in which MNEs operate. Economic 
interdependence affects the strategic discretion subsidiaries have to adjust to the specific 
conditions of the host countries in which they operate. The international business literature 
has long studied questions of local versus global corporate strategies, which are driven by the 
extent to which an MNE‟s international markets are interrelated.25 We extend the discussions 
of the international business literature, which are typically about generic competitive 
strategies, to the realm of the natural environment and a measure of regulatory differences.  
Regulatory Turbulence 
While environmental regulation can take various forms and cover different topics, its 
degree of stringency can be considered a key aspect. Stringent regulation is a largely 
exogenously determined institutional arrangement that covers a variety of aspects (including 
pollution, natural resource use, and biodiversity) and issues rules that clearly bound and guide 
corporate behavior. What is more, these strict, comprehensive rules are also enforced. Many 
countries have environmental regulations that are close to perfection by design, yet of little 
value because not implemented.
26
 The lack of implementation has a variety of reasons, the 
most important ones being corruption, shortfalling implementation capacity, and the 
prioritization of other public policy issues, such as poverty abatement. Unsurprisingly, many 
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developing countries have the least stringent environmental regimes. The World Economic 
Forum (WEF)‟s comprehensive assessment of the regulatory stringency of environmental 
regimes, such as perceived by business executives, shows an enormous variance across 
countries, ranging from 1.4 for Haiti to 6.7 for Germany (on a 7-point scale).
27
  
Over the period 2001-2008, the number of countries increasing their regulatory stringency 
was approximately matched by the number of those relaxing their environmental regulations. 
Along this measure, there is no conclusive trend of either regulatory convergence or 
divergence. Combining different degrees of regulatory stringency and regulatory fluctuation 
creates distinct country clusters (see Table 1).
28
  Regulatory turbulence captures the combined 
effects MNEs face due to ‘regulatory distance’ (measuring differences in the degrees of 
regulatory stringency of the countries in which MNEs operate) and ‘regulatory fluctuation’ 
(indicating changes over time of the regulatory stringency of the countries in which MNEs 
operate).
29
 Developed countries face, on average, a lower degree of regulatory fluctuation, but 
are not necessarily exempt from it. Likewise, a number of major developing countries (such 
as China) show considerable stability – albeit combined with relatively lax regulation. In 
general, however, countries whose regulatory practices are lenient are also clearly more 
unpredictable (with a 0.85 correlation between stringency and stability of environmental 
regulation).
30
 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 approximately here 
---------------------------------------- 
Lax regulatory regimes are interesting destinations for international business to the extent 
that they are less bound by strict environmental rules. Companies can use „outdated‟ 
production processes or export products that have been forbidden in more stringent countries 
because of their adverse effects on the natural environment or public health. While imposing 
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fewer restrictions and offering „pollution havens‟ for „dirty‟ companies, lax regimes also have 
drawbacks in terms of lower regulatory certainty, as a result of which (foreign) investors may 
be confronted with overnight changes in official regulation and/or actual practices. 
Unpredictability tends to discourage (international) business because investments – be they 
physical or relational – can wear out through such changes. At the macro level, the OECD has 
calculated that there exists a threshold value of 2.9: FDI decreases when the regulatory 
distance between home and host countries is too large. Apparently, MNEs perceive foreign 
investments as (too) risky when the regulatory turbulence they experience is high. The 
relative regulatory stringency (i.e., the regulatory distance between home and host countries) 
plays a more important role than the absolute level of regulatory stringency in a (prospective) 
host country. This finding is comparable to other studies on the relationship between FDI and 
the influence of regulation (on corruption, governance, and culture).
31
  MNEs thus tend to 
prefer investing in countries with comparable degrees of stringency.
32
 When companies start 
internationalizing, it is easier for them to manage their foreign operations in a relatively 
familiar institutional context. Afterwards, they may move to institutionally more distant host 
countries.
33
  
Market Interdependence 
Next to the institutional context, market forces are an important factor of how international 
businesses should operate. Since the late 1980s, many production processes have become 
increasingly internationalized. Quite a few production chains that used to be concentrated in 
one or a small number of countries – owing to trade-and-investment barriers, high transport 
costs, and communication difficulties – are now scattered over the globe, giving rise to the 
notion of „global factory‟ and global supply chains.34 Exploitation of international factor cost 
differences (i.e., lowly priced labor, land, or other resources) and the availability of 
complementary capacities (such as skilled, specialized labor) have led to advanced geographic 
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specialization and, hence, a high degree of value chain disaggregation.
35
 While the global 
factory has enabled international businesses to reduce production bottlenecks and save costs, 
it has also led to increased interdependence of geographically dispersed markets since the 
outputs early in the value chain are inputs to subsequent stages located elsewhere.
36
 Growing 
interdependence goes together with growing vulnerability to disruptions in the system, either 
through natural causes (such as tsunamis and earthquakes) or man-made drivers (like 
regulatory upheaval or societal unrest). Regulatory distance turns out to be a much more 
important factor than cultural distance in the entry-mode decision of MNEs.
37
  
Another source of interdependence that many internationally operating companies 
experience is reputation. This counts especially for firms offering branded consumer 
products. Companies that manage to „export‟ strong corporate or product brands can leverage 
their reputation. Modern communication technologies have facilitated the international 
dissemination of corporate or product brands. However, not only companies but also citizens 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have benefited from the possibilities to reach 
out to international audiences. As a result, negative or positive events occurring in one 
country are quickly disseminated around the world.
38
 The old adage that reputation damage 
travels fast thus has high relevance for firms whose success is contingent on strong reputation 
and brand image. This is particularly relevant for public business-to-consumer companies, 
which can instantaneously lose their reputation on markets for capital, consumers, and labor.
39
 
Both commercial successes and incidents or failures in one country become immediately 
exported to other countries, thus constituting another source of market interdependence. 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------- 
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While many international businesses thus face significant market interdependences, this is 
in no way true for all companies. Many activities have remained local in character owing to 
their „strategic nature‟ (qualifying them for state protection), cultural idiosyncracies (e.g., 
public relations and media), the continued importance of transport costs (as with soft drinks) 
or communication costs (as with certain IT applications), the impossibility to internationally 
trade (such as local services), or the lack of an internationalization tradition (for instance, real 
estate). An indicator of market interdependence is the Transnationality Index (TNI), which 
measures the average of the ratios foreign/total assets, sales, and employees for MNEs. A TNI 
of 50% or higher indicates that more operations are realized abroad than in an MNE‟s home 
country, suggesting a high degree of market interdependence, while a TNI of lower than 50% 
indicates a more limited commitment to, and interconnectedness with, foreign operations.
40
 
An illustration of uneven propensities to internationalize (and hence to face different 
degrees of market interdependence) is that MNEs from the United Kingdom internationalize 
about three times as much as their south-east European counterparts.
41
 The 
internationalization spread per sector also varies widely. Table 2 represents the TNI per sector 
for the 100 largest MNEs worldwide and the 100 largest MNEs from developing countries 
combined, showing a TNI as high as 76.8 for non-metallic mineral products to as low as 36.0 
for construction and real estate.
42
 When geographic markets are relatively disconnected, they 
are either served by local firms or by international companies that have „gone local‟. To recap, 
geographic specialization as well as corporate and product reputation entail high market 
interdependence for many internationally operating companies, while firms in certain sectors 
and from particular home countries tend to have a local orientation.  
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ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES 
So far, we have identified two key dimensions that make up the context within which MNEs 
craft their environmental strategies. The institutional dimension consists of the extent to 
which the regulatory stringency of a (prospective) host country is low or high relative to an 
MNE‟s home country (or portfolio of other countries in which an MNE operates). The 
economic dimension indicates the degree to which an MNE‟s operations in a (prospective) 
host country are interconnected with those in other geographic markets. In this section, we 
delineate four „basic‟ environmental strategies for MNEs entering or operating in a particular 
host country, based on different combinations of regulatory stringency and market 
interdependence (see Table 3).
43
 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------- 
To illustrate our argument with „real-life‟ examples, we selected four MNEs from 
developed countries (with relatively stringent regulations in their home countries) and four 
MNEs from major emerging markets (with relatively lax home regimes). The selected MNEs 
operate in sectors such as oil and gas, chemicals, electronics, and construction materials – 
industries which are prime targets for environmental regulation.  We followed these 
companies over the period 2001-2008, during which they followed different 
internationalization paths – thereby facing considerable international regulatory distance and 
fluctuation. The selected MNEs in the oil-and-gas sector are CNPC (China), Petrobras 
(Brazil), and Shell (United Kingdom-Netherlands). The chemicals sector is represented by 
Sinochem (China). Acer (Taiwan) and Philips (Netherlands) are electronics companies. The 
construction industry includes CEMEX (Mexico) and Tata Steel (India).  
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For each case company, we selected the five key host countries, based on either their 
largest sales markets and their biggest production and exploration sites. Table 4 presents for 
each MNE the TNI and the most important markets (home country and five main host 
countries) over the period 2001-2008. The table also describes the regulatory stringency and 
fluctuation per country as well as the difference between the laxest regime and the strictest 
one („regulatory spread‟) and the discrepancy between the least stable regime and the most 
stable one („fluctuation amplitude‟). All MNEs faced considerable regulatory spread and 
fluctuation. CEMEX, Tata, and Sinochem are the companies with the lowest spread of 
stringency degrees. The companies with the highest coordination problems due to very high 
regulatory turbulence are Shell, CNPC, and Petrobras, which had to invest in regulatorily 
weak and/or unstable countries (like Nigeria, Angola, and Sudan). Acer and Philips also 
experienced considerable regulatory dissimilarities due to the importance of both developed 
and developing countries in their market portfolios. Most companies thus faced the challenge 
of coping with high regulatory distance and strong fluctuation.  
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
----------------------------- 
Strategy 1: Fictitious Forcing  
When regulatory regimes are relatively lax and international interdependences are 
relatively low, firms face few restrictions and enjoy much discretion to operate as they deem 
fit. Under such circumstances, it is tempting for firms to engage in a „race to the bottom‟ by 
having recourse to „dirty‟ processes and products, since such behavior is neither sanctioned by 
regulatory authorities nor by international markets. Leading MNEs from emerging markets 
(such as CNPC, Petrobras,  Sinochem, and Tata Steel) initially did so in their home markets, 
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since they were operating in rather weak regulatory regimes and were relatively protected 
from foreign competition.  
Withstanding the temptation to adopt environmentally adverse practices is a wise strategy 
for forward-looking MNEs, for three reasons. First, the least stringent regulatory regimes also 
tend to be the most unpredictable ones. High tolerance of business activities with adverse 
environmental consequences may quite abruptly be followed by great zeal to uphold 
environmental values. Companies which may be tolerated under lax regimes but which live 
on a wrong footing with their local environments, thus having low legitimacy among the local 
population and authorities, become an easy target of radical changes – for instance, following 
popular upheaval after ecological incidents involving casualties.
44
 Indeed, proactive 
environmental strategies are rewarding for MNEs in the face of such regulatory uncertainty.
45
 
Voluntary corporate action is a particularly rational option to the extent that environmental 
investment costs are typically low and thus do not undermine corporate competitive 
positions,
46
 whereas the societal payoff due to precluded conflicts can be significant.
47
  
A second reason for not lowering the bar is that abundant natural resource use and 
pollution can be considered forms of economic inefficiency.
48
 Production processes requiring 
intensive energy use, ample raw materials, or emitting residual substances are manifestations 
of suboptimality. According to this philosophy, more (economic output) can be achieved with 
less (environmental load) by having a close look at how to use resources in more effective and 
efficient ways.
49
 Technological innovations that reduce negative environmental effects (e.g., 
by reducing natural resource consumption) may also grant companies a competitive edge.
50
  
A third reason to do more than required is to comply with commitments in stringent 
regimes through actions in countries with laxer regulations. For climate change, a global 
environmental problem, flexible instruments such as Joint Implementation and Clean 
Development Mechanism are in place, which allow firms to meet their emission-reduction 
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targets through relatively low investments in countries with more lenient regimes. For 
instance, the European Union limits greenhouse gas emissions of oil-and-gas companies, who 
may find it more cost-effective to obtain emission credits through voluntary investments in 
emerging markets.
51
 
While there are thus good business reasons to adopt environmentally stringent practices in 
relatively autonomous markets with lenient regulatory regimes, companies are unlikely to do 
so on a voluntary basis or at a sufficient pace. Therefore, they need to embrace a strategy of 
„fictitious forcing‟: acting as if they were forced by a stringent regulatory regime to operate 
with a low environmental impact. Necessity is the mother of all innovation. Without the 
perceived necessity to change, companies tend to stick to their „business-as-usual‟ routines,52 
especially in very competitive markets that stress short-term results,
53
 thereby foregoing 
opportunities to cut costs through eco-efficiency measures and tap into new sales markets for 
environmentally sensitive customers.
54
 Challenging these routines implies imagining very 
stringent future regulation around core environmental issues and then „backcasting‟ solutions 
to implement this fictitious regulation.
55
 In case this regime materializes later on, companies 
have taken a headstart. In case it does not, they can still benefit from certain business 
advantages such as cost savings, extra revenues, and boosted employee motivation.
56
 It should 
also be kept in mind that small investments can have substantial environmental payoffs (such 
as purifying effluent water to save the local environment), thereby enhancing the local 
legitimacy of corporate activities.  
This strategy thus looks like a „no regret‟ option but goes beyond easy, low-hanging-fruit 
measures by self-questioning existing activities. This is not to say that environmentally benign 
initiatives always pay off, but many companies leave an existing potential underutilized or 
even untapped. For instance, Tata, which in its early internationalization process entered host 
countries with relatively lenient regimes, has a strong track record of corporate responsibility, 
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among other reasons out of enlightened self-interest. Tata Motors recently launched the Nano 
car, designed for emerging markets (with their lenient regimes) but meeting stringent 
(European Union) norms for vehicle emissions.
57
 Petrobras has also adopted a beyond-
compliance environmental strategy. Alarmed by several oil spills in its home country in the 
early 2000s, the MNE forced itself into a rigorous spill-prevention program (including a 
formal environmental management system and a proactive culture), drove its suppliers to 
become greener, and entered into renewable energy.
58
 An example of a fictitious forcing 
strategy by an MNE from a developed country is Philips‟ woodstove, an innovative product 
designed specifically for low-income consumers in developing countries, reducing wood 
consumption and abating in-door air pollution that ensue from open-fire cooking.
59
 
Implementing a fictitious forcing strategy starts by identifying the main environmental 
challenges. For natural-resource-intensive MNEs, this may be deforestation (for instance, to 
grow palm trees) and shrinking biodiversity (due to monoculture). Manufacturing firms may 
see air pollution and energy efficiency as key environmental challenges, while service 
companies may face energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions from transport 
movements as the main issues. Once identified, MNEs then address the main environmental 
challenges through the adoption of existing „best practices‟ – such as those implemented by 
firms operating in environmentally stringent regimes – or, in their absence, by thinking up 
measures that would be likely candidates for combating undesired environmental effects. 
Next, MNEs assess how such measures would impact existing or prospective business 
operations. The final step is to take organizational and technical initiatives that both make 
business sense (by using fewer inputs, serving environmentally sensitive markets, etc.) and 
that lead to conformity with the fictitious stringent regime. In short, MNEs facing few 
institutional and market restrictions should still imagine very stringent regulation around their 
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core environmental issues and adopt profitable measures to comply with such a fictitious 
regime. 
Strategy 2: Local Compliance  
A persistent misconception is that international firms expand their activities from countries 
with stringent environmental regulation to those with laxer regimes. Yet, in many cases, 
companies have operations in foreign countries with more stringent regulatory regimes. Many 
FDIs are among developed countries – including those from countries with relatively lenient 
regimes to those with stricter regulations – because of the need of complementary, skilled 
labor.
60
 While emerging-market MNEs such as CNPC and Petrobras tend to favor investments 
in nearby countries or regions with relatively weak regulatory regimes, they are increasingly 
entering developed countries as well.
61
 Such investments require these emerging-market 
MNEs to overcome considerable upward regulatory distance – although they also benefit 
from the reduced regulatory fluctuation that typifies more demanding regimes. When MNEs 
are confronted with more stringent host-country environmental regulation and when their 
activities have little interdependence with operations in other countries, the best strategic 
choice is to comply with local regulation. First because MNEs have but little choice: 
companies that fail to comply with environmental regulations that are enforced – as is the case 
in stringent regimes – will be sued, thereby compromising their business continuity. Second, 
there is no reason to defect because their competitors are exposed to the same strict rules, thus 
ensuring a level playing field that does not leave them worse off when complying.  
Implementing a local compliance strategy is relatively straightforward, since the regulatory 
authorities will impose meeting a number of environmental stipulations (in relation to air, 
water, and land pollution, energy efficiency, and ban of toxic substances), typically specified 
in environmental permits, as a prerequisite for getting a license to operate. Meeting these 
regulatory demands implies that firms need to obtain new knowledge, to the extent that 
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compliance may necessitate unprecedented changes of practices. The adoption of more 
advanced environmental practices may involve investing in more state-of-the-art 
technologies, changes of components or other product specifications, and reconsidering extant 
corporate routines. Such changes are often challenging, since MNEs are inclined to transfer 
home-country practices to host countries. „Going local‟ or relying on externally obtained or 
co-developed competencies through acquisitions or joint ventures in other host countries with 
stringent regimes may then be imperative to comply with local regulatory requirements. 
Joint ventures and acquisitions are, indeed, effective ways of coping with the regulatory 
differences between home and host countries, because they enable MNEs to bridge the 
competency gap that results from facing a relatively stringent host-country regime – even 
though such entry modes entail higher coordination costs. The recent generation of emerging-
market MNEs (such as Tata Steel and Sinochem) have used such „springboarding‟ strategies 
to enter developed countries,
62
 often at prices well beyond book value, to acquire advanced 
technological and organizational knowledge, including environmentally relevant know-how.
63
 
Strategy 3: Standard Extension  
Even when regulatory pressure is low, an MNE has only little discretion when corporate 
activities in a host country are interconnected with those elsewhere. First, disaggregated value 
chains rely on product or process standards as a way to integrate the activities performed at 
geographically dispersed locations.
64
 Firms with operations in different countries require their 
subsidiaries or external suppliers to scrupulously comply with carefully designed standards to 
ensure the different components or sequences of actions are compatible. Another reason to 
standardize is to achieve economies of scale (i.e., low costs of components procured in bulk 
quantities or declining production costs from cumulative learning-by-doing).
65
 When 
standardized products are designed, the environmental standards of the most stringent 
regulatory regime become determinant.
66
 Failing to comply precludes companies from serving 
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the market with stringent environmental regulation, while beyond-compliance never leads to 
exclusion. Therefore, firms applying advanced standards in the home market (or other host 
countries) to meet home-market (or other host-country) regulatory requirements should extend 
these standards to host countries with more lenient regimes. For instance, airplanes that 
cannot exceed certain noise or emission levels to enter North American airports will also be 
produced for African customers who only perform intracontinental flights, since aircraft are 
highly standardized products. International firms whose corporate or brand reputation is a 
distinctive competitive advantage (like Philips or CEMEX, both having high degrees of 
transnationality) extend home-country standards to host countries with lax regimes for a 
different reason. Environmentally unfriendly processes or products by highly visible firms – 
as is the case with companies thriving on their reputation – are easy targets of environmental 
activists.
67
 They will readily identify and communicate „environmental evils‟ to the outside 
world, arguing that these powerful companies take advantage of vulnerable host countries. 
Since modern communication technologies bring such information almost instantaneously to 
citizen-consumers around the world, adversely perceived practices are a threat to companies 
with internationally known names. Therefore, companies seeking to safeguard their reputation 
have every reason to shy away from inferior environmental practices. Oftentimes, MNEs from 
developed countries scrupulously comply with local legislation in weak regimes to avoid 
negative publicity in their home countries.
68
 Oil-and-gas company Shell failed to do so and 
suffered substantial reputation damage in a series of alleged environmental offenses, 
including oil spills in Nigeria. The company was recently removed from the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index of leading companies.
69
 By contrast, Philips – which has outsourced most 
of its production activities – has imposed relatively stringent environmental standards on all 
of its suppliers, including those from countries with lenient regimes. 
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A related motive for using environmental practices beyond local institutional requirements 
is to signal to environmentally sensitive customers that the natural environment has been 
respected despite a regulatory void at the location of production. Indeed, ecolabels have 
mushroomed over the past few years, showing customers in (generally wealthy) export 
markets that the products were produced under environmentally responsible conditions.
70
 
Ecolabels are voluntary standards seeking to regulate environmental aspects of economic 
activities, including – or even especially – in countries with lax regimes. Companies adopt 
ecolabels as a „satisfier‟ for customers that only buy „responsible products‟ or as a mark-up 
for customers willing to pay a price premium for preserving the environment. The Dutch-
British food MNE Unilever attaches much importance to globally uniform environmental 
standards and has played a leading role in the development and implementation of the Marine 
Stewardship Council label for sustainable fishing.
71
 Ecolabels differ from corporate or brand 
reputation in the sense that these labels are not company-specific – as such „proprietary‟ 
labels would undermine their credibility – and focus on environmental characteristics as such, 
whereas reputation generally pertains to product quality and image. Yet both concur in the 
sense that they aim to communicate tenets that are not embodied in the products and are thus 
not observable by (lay) customers, such as the impact on the natural environment or public 
health.
72
 In a similar vein, many MNEs have imposed ISO 14001 certification for all of their 
subsidiaries to signal their commitment to systematic environmental management to the 
outside world.
73
  
Implementing a standard extension strategy starts by identifying those aspects of local 
operations that have repercussions for business activities in other countries. These may be 
components that are banned in export markets, standardized semimanufactures to be 
assembled with elements produced in another country, reputational exposure because of the 
presence of foreign NGO watchdogs, etc. In the case of standards, the next step is to apply the 
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product specifications that have been designed up front or to prescribe process and output 
criteria to comply with ecolabel requirements. When there is reputational risk, standard 
operating procedures need to be put in place to minimize the likelihood of environmental 
incidents. Furthermore, companies should avoid practices that are likely to attract negative 
attention from NGOs (such as the use of chemicals outlawed elsewhere). Given the regulatory 
vacuum, corporate enforcement or third-party control are critical to ensure that rules are 
abided by.
74
  In sum, international business should extend relatively stringent standards to 
more lenient host countries when their business models thrive on standardized products and 
processes, corporate or product reputation, and responding to environmental customer 
demands.  
Strategy 4: Standard Upgrading  
A different strategy is called for when markets are interconnected yet the (prospective) 
host-country regulatory regime is more stringent than the ones encountered in other countries 
in which MNEs operate. In order to access a new market with more stringent environmental 
requirements than those in existing markets, MNEs need to adjust to the most stringent regime 
(i.e., the new host country). Like before, this ratcheting up is important when companies have 
standardized processes and products to reap scale economies, thrive on corporate or brand 
reputation to serve upper-echelon markets, and/or serve environmentally conscious customers.  
Standards meeting regulatory requirements, societal expectations, and customer demands 
in a host country with an environmental regime that is stringent relative to those experienced 
elsewhere then set the stage for company-wide practices. As a result, MNEs need to upgrade 
existing standards to the level of the most stringent host-country regime. Obviously, entering 
a relatively demanding host country is only attractive for MNEs to the extent that the costs of 
switching to the higher host-country standards are outweighed by advantages such as getting 
access to financially rewarding or strategically significant production locations and sales 
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markets. Given the necessity to perform company-wide changes, this strategy differs 
fundamentally from the previous strategy, which entails merely extending existing standards 
to another country. An illustration of a standard upgrading strategy is Acer, which put a lot of 
effort into establishing a strong global brand name – thereby becoming more transnational. 
One way of improving its reputation in major sales markets such as the United States and 
Europe has been to upgrade its environmental standards, which Greenpeace rated at 2.3 in 
2005 and 4.1 in 2010.
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Implementing a standard upgrading strategy entails first identifying those regulatory 
stipulations that have relevance for operations in other countries. The next step is to assess 
which operations or outputs would lead to mismatches with operations or outputs in other 
countries. Rectifying these mismatches will then lead to redesigning product specifications or 
banning certain substances used elsewhere. Host countries need to be attractive locations (in 
terms of production or sales markets) before companies universally adjust their existing 
standards to accommodate the regulatory demands in more stringent regimes. California and 
Germany are examples of large markets with relatively stringent regulatory regimes that have 
induced several MNEs to upgrade their standards.
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Environmental Strategy Dynamics 
Regime changes can lead to both stricter and laxer regulations. Furthermore, 
interdependences among an MNE‟s geographic markets may increase or decrease over time. 
As a result, four types of dynamics can be elaborated (see Table 5). 
Tightening up. Affluent nation-states tend to have more stringent environmental regimes 
than poorer countries.
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 Therefore, lax regimes are likely to become stricter when countries 
become more prosperous. This happens because higher national income gives authorities 
more tax income and hence more latitude to combat corruption and enhance regulatory 
enforcement capacity.
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 Another reason is that, once basic needs have been met, people attach 
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more priority to environmental protection and will pressurize their politicians to issue and 
enforce stringent regulation.
79
 So, over time, a country‟s regulatory regime tends to tighten up 
when national income rises. An example of a (recently) changing regulatory regime is China, 
where the enormous environmental challenges and enhanced prosperity have driven the 
authorities to become less tolerant of industrial pollution, partly in response to popular 
protests against heavily polluted living areas.
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 Companies with a fictitious forcing strategy 
obviously have a headstart vis-à-vis less forward-looking firms when a regulatory regime 
tightens up. MNEs with high market interdependence may have to change from extending to 
upgrading their standards. For instance, when CNPC‟s international branch (Petrochina) 
became listed on the New York Stock exchange in 2000, it embraced international 
(environmental) standards; in 2010, it also adopted a new „green‟ logo.  
Loosening up. While regime tightening is the more frequent type of change, given rising 
incomes and magnifying environmental problems (especially in emerging markets), 
regulatory regimes may also loosen up. This can happen when newly elected politicians form 
governments that attach less importance to environmental preservation. Alternatively, 
governments may relax environmental policies to attract foreign investors. While there is no 
strong evidence of a „race to the bottom‟, certain pollution-intensive industries (such as basic 
metals, chemicals, and paper-and-pulp) are sensitive to such changes given the relatively high 
costs of complying with stringent regulation.
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 In such cases, forward-looking MNEs are still 
better off pursuing a (business) win – (environmental) win through a fictitious forcing strategy 
or fall back on their global/home-country standards. For instance, while the United States has 
still not adopted a stringent greenhouse-gas-reduction policy at the federal level, many 
companies have taken proactive mitigation measures, both to anticipate potential future 
regulatory changes and to benefit from the associated economic benefits, especially in terms 
of resource efficiency.
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 The degree of regulatory fluctuation in the home market also plays a 
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role in this strategy. An MNE like Shell faced more regulatory turbulence in its Dutch home 
country than, say, German-based MNEs. Such fluctuations might stimulate the company to 
lower the performance level of its environmental practices, both at home and in its host 
countries.    
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
----------------------------- 
Coupling. Another dynamic is that MNEs may turn their local strategies into more global 
ones. Fictitious forcing or the necessity to comply with local legislation may induce 
companies to come up with solutions that eventually bring them competitive advantage, 
thereby driving firms to turn local successes into more global standards. An example is 
Philips, which initially had a reactive compliance strategy to meet the environmental 
requirements of Dutch authorities. While doing so, the firm discovered the business 
opportunities of eco-efficiency and positioning products as „green flagships‟, which have now 
become part of Philips‟ global strategy to save costs and boost its reputation as an 
environmentally responsible company. 
Decoupling. An opposite dynamic may also unfold. When the costs of adjusting existing 
standards to the requirements of stringent host countries outweigh the advantages or if 
regulatory requirements strongly diverge across countries, companies may choose to 
„decouple‟ market interdependencies. For instance, the very stringent REACH legislation 
(around the registration, evaluation, and authorization of chemical substances) in the 
European Union might drive a company like Sinochem to decouple its costly European 
environmental practices from those in its home country (China) to avoid such high costs in the 
latter market. Decoupling can be done by designing and producing different products and by 
using different brands for host countries with stringent regimes. In such cases, the foregone 
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scale economies and/or reputational benefits are smaller than the costs of global adjustments 
to standards or brands. Decoupling puts MNEs back into the traditional position of a 
multidomestic organization. Since most companies either face or anticipate increasing degrees 
of internationalization and market interdependence, this strategic change is relatively 
unattractive.   
 
CONCLUSION: MANAGING REGULATORY TURBULENCE 
We have shed a light on effective environmental strategies for MNEs against the backdrop of 
regulatory regimes that diverge across countries and show varying degrees of fluctuation. 
Given these international differences, companies struggle with the question of whether to „go 
local‟ and adjust to the prevailing regulatory regimes in host countries or to adopt globally or 
regionally uniform standards, and, if so, which ones. Our main argument is that the 
appropriate environmental strategy is not a one-size-fits-all answer but is contingent on both 
the regulatory regime of a host country and the degree to which a company‟s international 
markets are interconnected. We have thus argued that environmental strategies of MNEs are 
most effective when aligned with their internationalization strategies.  
We introduced a regulatory turbulence tool, consisting of a two-sponged approach. First, 
the descriptive component (presented in Table 4) assesses the market interdependence of 
MNEs (as measured through their TNI score) in conjunction with the regulatory stringency 
and changes over time of the environmental regulations of their major production and sales 
countries (based on the WEF‟s ranking of national regimes). Second, the prescriptive 
component (summarized in Table 5) indicates which strategies are most effective for MNEs 
given their market/regulation combinations and dynamics.  
By taking an integrative view, we have explored under what conditions environmentally 
benign actions make business sense. When environmental considerations are core ingredients 
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of a company‟s business strategy, the environmental function is much better secured than 
when the environment is regarded in isolation and only costs money to meet regulations.
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Integrative decisions based on a holistic view of MNE activities thus offer opportunities to see 
the natural environment as a source of cost savings and additional revenues. While the 
business advantages of environmentally proactive strategies have been recognized earlier, 
they have hardly been analyzed in the context of MNEs facing a world of regulatory 
turbulence – and even less so for MNEs from emerging markets. Central to our argument is 
that environmental strategies should not only take into account (prospective) host-country 
regulatory regimes but also a company‟s interactions with operations in other countries.  
Since MNEs are faced with different degrees of regulatory stringency and market 
interdependence, their strategies are only effective when tailored to the relevant combination 
of these institutional and economic factors. 
Environmental strategies are not static. Regulatory regimes not only differ across countries 
but are also in flux. Economic affluence or crisis, environmental incidents, and political 
elections impact the evolution of the stringency of environmental regulations. As a result, 
international businesses may need to reconsider their environmental strategies when such 
regime changes occur, since laxer or stricter regimes call for different strategies. While 
regulatory regimes are largely exogenously determined (i.e., outside of the sphere of influence 
of most MNEs), the degree of market interdependence is more endogenous to international 
businesses. Firms can decide to leverage successful local business practices by turning them 
into corporate standards for other countries. Alternatively, when the costs of local compliance 
are high or reputational risks are present, they may deliberately forego scale economies and 
decouple their environmental practices.  
We have argued that there are ample opportunities to reconcile environmental and business 
strategies, but also recognize that the „holy grail‟ of „doing well by doing good‟ has its 
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limitations. Certain environmentally benign actions pay off financially, while others do not 
because their effects are external to the companies taking them. There is often, but not always, 
a business case for proactive environmental strategies. While disregarding the natural 
environment or setting low environmental ambition levels may be tempting when operating in 
countries with lax regimes, we have argued that this may backfire on MNEs – both locally (by 
foregoing business opportunities or encountering clashes with local communities) and 
globally (by suffering from mismatches with business operations in other countries). When 
there is no pecuniary payoff, MNEs should either merely comply with prevailing rules or 
invoke the „normative case‟ for environmentally benign actions.84 The latter might be 
especially relevant in lax regimes with „regulatory voids.‟ Since many positive environmental 
outcomes take modest financial investments, companies do not have to compromise their 
competitive positions when taking  relatively advanced environmental measures, even when 
not required by law. Using this strategic discretion and integrating contextualized, dynamic 
regulatory and market imperatives are the foundations for crafting realistic and sustainable 
environmental strategies.   
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Table 1: Regulatory Stringency/Fluctuation Combinations in Selected Countries (2001-2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 Average Environmental Regulatory stringency 
Low Medium High 
Regulatory 
Fluctuation 
Low Argentina; China;  
Ecuador;  Philippines; 
Russia; Zimbabwe 
 
Estonia; Latvia; Mexico; 
Poland;  Portugal; Spain; 
Thailand  
Australia; Belgium; 
Canada; Denmark; 
Finland; Germany; Japan; 
New Zealand;  Norway; 
Singapore; Sweden; 
Switzerland; Taiwan; 
United Kingdom  
Medium Bolivia; Guatemala; 
Honduras; Nicaragua; 
Peru; Sri Lanka; Ukraine; 
Venezuela 
Bulgaria; Chili; 
Colombia; Costa Rica; 
Greece; Hong Kong; 
Hungary;  South Korea; 
South Africa; Lithuania 
Austria; Czech Republic; 
France; Ireland; 
Netherlands; United 
States 
High Angola; Bangladesh; 
Indonesia; Morocco; 
Nigeria; Pakistan; 
Vietnam 
Brazil; Egypt; India;  
Israel; Italy; Malaysia; 
Turkey 
Iceland; Ireland  
Stringency: low = 1.4-3.4; medium = 3.5-4.9; high = 5.0- 6.7   
Fluctuation:  low = 0.0-0.2; medium = 0.3-0.4; high = 0.5-1.0 
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Table 2: Sectoral Transnationality Index 
 
 
Sector 
Number of  
‘Top 100’ 
MNEs   
Average TNI per 
sector  
Non-metallic mineral products   5 76.8 
Industrial Services   4 73.5 
Aircraft   3 68.7 
Food, beverages, and tobacco   11 63.7 
Diversified   14 63.4 
Pharmaceuticals   10 63.3 
Transport and storage   5 61.3 
Chemicals   5 60.3 
Other consumer services   5 59.8 
Other consumer goods   5 57.9 
Electrical & electronic 
equipment 
  23 57.0 
Motor vehicles   12 56.8 
Mining & quarrying   6 56.2 
Telecommunications   18 55.9 
Utilities (Electricity, gas, and 
water) 
  13 54.6 
Retail & Trade   4 53.9 
Wholesale trade   7 53.6 
Wood and paper products   1 53.6 
Other equipments goods   3 53.0 
Metal and metal products   14 47.7 
Petroleum expl./ref./distr.   19 43.3 
Construction and real estate   7 36.0 
 
194 
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Table 3: Environmental Strategies for Regulation/Market Configurations 
 
 
 
   
Regulatory Regime: Degree of Host-Country Stringency 
 
                                      
 
 
Low 
 
 
High 
 
 
Market 
Interdependence: 
 
Degree of 
Transnationality 
 
Low 
                           
Fictitious Forcing Strategy 
                                
 
                        
Local Compliance Strategy 
 
 
 
High 
 
Standard Extension Strategy 
 
 
 
Standard Upgrading Strategy 
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Table 4: Regulatory Turbulence Portfolio for Selected Cases 
 
 
 
MNE  
 (2001-2008) 
Regula-
tory 
Regime: 
Home 
Country 
Five Major Host Countries Regula-
tory 
Spread+ 
Fluctua-
tion 
Ampli-
tude^ 
CNPC 
TNI:  
5.0-1.7 
 China Kazach. Sudan Peru Cana. Iran   
Average 3.3↓ 3.2→ n.a. 2.9↑ 5.8↓ n.a. high  
Fluctuation 0.2 0.0 high 0.4 0.2 n.a.  high 
Petrobras 
TNI:  
6.1-9.7 
 Brazil Angola Argent. Boliv. India US   
Average 4.7↑ 1.9↑ 3.2↓ 2.7↓ 3.9↑ 5.5↓ 3.6  
fluctuation 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4  0.1 
Tata Steel  
TNI:  
9.6-69.8 
 India UK Neth. Thail. Singa. Austral.   
Average 3.9↑ 5.8↓ 6.3↓ 4.2↑ 5.7↓ 5.8↓ 2.4++  
Fluctuation 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2  -0.5 
Acer  
TNI:  
26.5-77.4 
 Taiwan China Japan US Neth. Mexico   
Average 5.3↓ 3.3↓ 5.7↑ 5.5↓ 6.3↓ 3.8↑ 3.0  
Fluctuation 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2  0.3 
 Sinochem 
TNI:  
55.4-36.8 
 China Singa. UK UAE Colo. Thail.   
Average 3.3↓ 5.7↓ 5.8↓ 4.4↑ 4.0↑ 4.2↑ 2.5++  
Fluctuation 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2  0.1 
CEMEX 
TNI:  
61.4-82.0 
 Mexico Spain Poland Israel China UAE   
Average 3.8↑ 4.7↓ 4.0↓ 4.7↑ 3.3↓ 4.4→ 1.4++  
Fluctuation 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.0  0.5 
 Shell  
TNI:  
62.0-73.0 
 Neth. UK* US Oman Russ. Nigeria   
Average 6.3↓ 5.8↓ 5.5↓ n.a. 3.1↑ 2.6↑ 3.7  
Fluctuation 0.3 0.1 0.4 n.a. 0.1 0.7  0.4 
 Philips  
TNI:  
88.4-84.8 
 Neth. US Germ. Fran. China UK   
Average 6.3↓ 5.5↓ 6.7↓ 5.7↓. 3.3↓ 5.8↓ 3.4  
Fluctuation 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.1  0.1 
 
*     Dual home country  
+     Regulatory spread:  maximum distance between highest and lowest regulatory regime 
++  Score is below the regulatory „threshold‟ value of 2.9 
^     Fluctuation amplitude: highest distance above home-country level of fluctuation 
↑↓ Direction of change in the 2001-2008 period 
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Table 5: Environmental Strategy Dynamics for Regulation/Market Configurations 
 
   
Regulatory Regime: Degree of Host-Country Stringency 
 
             
 
 
Low  
 
 
High  
 
 
 
Market  
Interdependence: 
 
 Degree of 
Transnationality 
 
 
 
Low 
 
Fictitious Forcing Strategy 
 
 
 
 
Local Compliance Strategy 
 
 
 
High  
 
 
 
Standard Extension Strategy 
 
 
 
 
Standard Upgrading Strategy 
 
Tightening up 
Loosening up 
Decoupling 
Coupling 
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